Thursday, December 10, 2009

Colbert on The Fed


Steven Colbert defends the Federal Reserve. Not much worse than Bernanke's academic defenders. Check it out!

(Colbert often mentions that he is from South Carolina, and sometimes that he is from Charleston. He spent some of his childhood on James Island, where I live and served as a member of town council. I always think of Colbert as our native son.)

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

$100 Trillion Bill


David Beckworth has a hundred trillion dollar bill, from Zimbabwe, on his blog, Macro and Other Market Musings. A 3 percent growth path for nominal expenditure would keep the U.S. from having anything similar.

"Tight Money" and Real Income


"Tight money" is an excess demand for money. The quantity of money is less than the amount of money people want to hold. Unfortunately, tight money impacts the economy, which changes the amount of money people want to hold. For example, monetary disequilibrium impacts real output and real income, which in turn, changes money demand.

When people have less money than they want to hold, they reduce their expenditures or sell nonmonetary assets. It is likely that at least some of the effect of an excess demand for money will be reduced expenditure on output--currently produced goods and services. It is likely that firms will partly respond to the reduced sales of output by cutting back production.

Reduced output results in reduced real income. Assuming that the services from money are normal goods, then lower real income reduces the demand to hold money. If output and income are sufficiently low, the demand to hold money will decrease enough to match the existing quantity of money.

Does this solve the problem of monetary disequilibrium? Of course it doesn't. It is the most disruptive and destructive symptom of monetary disequilibrium.

Yeager, following Keynes, describes this process as an application of the "Fundamental Proposition of Monetary Theory." The individual can adjust his or her quantity of money to the amount demanded, but the economy as a whole must adjust the demand to hold money to a given quantity of money.

Because the actions of the individuals in response to an excess demand or supply of money--changing expenditures--plausibly impacts real output and real income, and because the demand to hold money depends on real income, changes in real income is a means by which the demand to hold money adjusts to the existing quantity.

The fundamental proposition of monetary theory is related to the "Paradox of Thrift." The paradox of thrift claims that an individual can increase saving by reducing consumption, adding to net worth, and expanding his or her ability to consume in the future. However, when everyone tries to save by reducing consumption expenditures, firms sell less and produce less. This reduces real output and real income. Since lower real income plausibly reduces saving, the effort to increase saving by reduced consumption expenditures can fail for the economy as a whole.

A variant of the paradox of thrift focuses on credit markets and debt. Saving is the difference between income and consumption. Individual households can save by spending income on assets, like stocks, bonds, or real estate, rather than consumer goods and services. The accumulated assets represent an increase in net worth.

An individual can also save by using income to pay down existing debt rather than purchasing consumer goods and services. By reducing liabilities, this also increases net worth.

Finally, a household can save by reducing expenditures of money on consumer goods and services and not spending it on anything. The accumulated money balances is an increase in assets, and so, in net worth.

It is this last avenue for increasing saving--spending on nothing and accumulating money--that is one aspect of the fundamental proposition of monetary theory. The second avenue--paying down debt--is related to claims that households are currently "overleveraged," with too much existing debt relative to their incomes, and that this results in a decrease in aggregate expenditures and reduced output.

Keynes described the "Paradox of Thrift" and explained how a kind of cumulative rot, which he called "the multiplier," will result in reductions in real output and real income, so that efforts to increase saving are frustrated by growing poverty. The effort to save results in a decrease in expenditure on consumer goods and services. This reduces the income of those selling the consumer goods and services. Because of their reduced incomes, they spend less on consumer goods and services. That reduces the incomes of those who were selling those consumer goods and services. Only when income falls enough so that saving decreases on net, will the cumulative rot end, and the economy stabilize at a lower level of real income.

However, this cumulative rot only applies to an excess demand for money. If individual households choose to save by spending on nothing and accumulating money, then expenditures on consumer goods fall without any offsetting increase in expenditures on anything else. Those selling consumer goods receive less money in payment, and so they now are short on money. In order to rebuild their money holdings, they reduce expenditures, and so on. One way that the demand for money can decrease enough to match the existing quantity of money is for real income to fall.

What about saving by purchasing assets? What about saving by paying down debts? When households use income to purchase stocks, bonds, or real estate, those selling the assets have the money. What do they do with it? If they hold it, then there is an excess demand for money. If not, then they spend it. If they spend it, what do those receiving the money do with the funds?

Similarly, when saving occurs through a repayment of debt, those who had lent the funds receive the money. If they hold it, then there is an excess demand for money. If they spend it, then what do those receiving the money do with the funds? The only peculiarity of the process regarding credit is that if the loans had been funded by monetary liabilities, then the repayment of the loans can result in a decrease in the quantity of money. Other things being equal, that creates an excess demand for money.

Thinking about what happens to the money when it is saved is not supposed to suggest that there cannot be an increase in the demand for money, (or a decrease in the quantity of bank created money.) It is rather to show that saving can only generate the sort of cumulative rot that would create a paradox of thrift if it either directly or indirectly creates an excess demand for money. There is nothing to the paradox of thrift other than a distorted version of the fundamental proposition of monetary theory.

It is hard to imagine that anyone would consider a reduction output, employment, and real income to be an acceptable, much less optimal, response to an excess demand for money. The most important aspect of economic actitivity is the use of scarce resources to produce the consumer goods and services that people want most. The process of production, earning income, and the expenditure of that income on the produced output is essential that activity.

It is possible, of course, that people may prefer additional leisure time to the purposes they can achieve with additional goods and services. If that is true, then reduced production is desirable, but only because of the value of the additional leisure. It is also possible that people may prefer more consumer goods and services in the present. Because of scarcity, the result will be less production of capital goods, and reduced productive capacity and output in the future. But that doesn't make reduced production optimal in the present.

Shifts in the allocation of labor and capital goods between fields of endeavor can reduce the productive capacity of the economy. The relevant productive capacity is the capacity to produce what people want to buy. There are any number of things that can and should temporarily or permanently result in a temporary or permanent reduction in real output and real income. Such temporary or permanent changes in real income are changes in potential income.

But a shortage of money is not one of those things. Disrupting the production of goods and services, reducing real output, employment, and real income, in order to impoverish people enough so that they are satisfied with the existing quantity of money is unacceptable. The level of real income that would exist without such disruption is potential income--the productive capacity of the economy.

So, what is "tight money?"

It is when the quantity of money is less than what the demand for money would be if real income is where it should be.

And where should it be? It should be equal to potential income."Tight money" exists with the quantity of money is less than the demand to hold money when "the" real interest rate is equal to the natural interest rate which coordinates saving and investment and real income is equal to potential income, the productive capacity of the economy.

"Tight money" might cause nominal interest rates on nonmonetary assets to rise, reducing the demand to hold money. "Tight money" might cause real income to fall, reducing the demand for money. But neither of these things count as fixing "tight money," they are rather symptoms of the disruptions created by "tight money."

I have already discussed the interest rate on money, both currency and deposits in other posts, but there is more to be said--especially how changes in those interest rate could, but are unlikely to, correct "tight money."

Of course, there are two other key macroeconomic variables that impact money demand-- the price level and its expected rate of change. How do they relate to "tight money?" In my view, it all depends on the fundamental nominal anchor of the monetary system and the economic order.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Unleasing Capitalism: Free Market for South Carolina


The South Carolina Policy Council has just released a new book, Unleashing Capitalism. The book is available online. I think it is just what South Carolina needs (and not just because they let me be on the Advisory Board.)

Saturday, December 5, 2009

Rowe on Banking


Nick Rowe has an excellent post on what he calls the orthodox and the heterodox views of how bad banks cause problems.

What he calls the heterodox view is right out of Yeager. Banks create money and so can lend money into existence. An individual can correct a shortage of money by spending less. The result for the economy as a whole is lower nominal expenditure.

Perhaps banks that have taken losses and so have too little net worth will fail to lend enough money into existence. If banks fail to lend enough money into existence, there can be a shortage of money, and lower nominal expenditures. Rowe does a great job laying out the problem.

Some complications are that banks fund their activities with a variety of liabilities, only some of which plausibly serve as money. Further, banks hold a variety of assets, with different legal requirements for capital. Further, it is plausible that the amount of capital required to reassure depositors is different for different sorts of assets.

A capital constrained bank can fund more of its asset portfolio with monetary liabilities--checkable deposits. It can shift its asset porfolio from commercial loans to short term, low risk securities. Short term government bonds are obvious. In the U.S. there is a zero capital requirement for government bonds, and it would be sensible for banks too keep little capital to the degree Treasury Bills make up a large portion of their asset portfolio. Interest rate risk suggests that some capital is necessary if banks hold long term government bonds, but perhaps less than commercial loans.

My only criticism of Rowe is that he leaves out currency. Bank money is tied to currency by convertibility. The government monopolizes the issue of currency and pays a zero nominal interest rate. As Yeager explained in 1956, if nominal interest rates get very low (and certainly at zero) any excess demand for securities results in a spillover excess demand for money. (It is like the land example. What if people want to save by purchasing land, and there is an excess demand for land. Suppose frustrated land buyers just hold onto money? There is a spill0ver from the excess demand for land to an excess demand for money.)

Since bank money bears interest, and can have negative yields, then as interest rates fall on securities, the interest rates banks are willing to pay on monetary liabilities decreases as well. That reduces the demand for money, and fixes the problem. Tying in the key role of currency, however, shows that if interest rates on deposits get much below zero, the excess demand for securities near zero shifts into an excess demand for currency.

Either the connection between bank money and currency has to be broken, or else the monopoly issuer has to fix the excess demand for currency. If the excess demand for money exists because it is a spillover from an excess demand for securities, then having the central bank create additional currency by purchasing those same securities in excess demand cannot fix the problem. If the central bank wants to provide a perfectly liquid and zero risk asset at a zero nominal interest rate that serves as the medium of redemption for all the rest of the medium of exchange, then it needs to purchase longer term and higher risk securities. The central bank must bear additional risk--interest rate and/or credit risk.

And that is the rest of the story--how Rowe's orthodox and heterodox views can be made consistent.

Friday, December 4, 2009

Does the world need more monetary ease?


My view is that the Fed should explicitly target a return of nominal expenditure to the trend growth path of the Great Moderation, with a slight modification--3% nominal growth starting from third quarter 2008 and forward. The target should be about $16.1 trillion for the fourth quarter of 2010, about 11% higher than the third quarter of 2009.

How to achieve this? First, make the commitment. Second, stop paying interest on reserve balances at the Fed. And finally, make a commitment to significant quantitative easing.

On Free Exchange, a post describes a specific proposal by Joseph Gagnon of the Peterson Institute to implement significant quantitative easing.
Namely: buy an additional $2 trillion in government bonds, with an average maturity of 7 years. That would be in addition to the $1.75 trillion of Treasury and mortgage-related debt it has already almost finished buying.

Gagnon predicts that the effects would be:
the additional $2 trillion would lower Treasury yields about 0.75 percentage points. That, he reckons, would lower private borrowing rates, boost stock prices 13%, and lower the dollar by 5%. The combined stimulative impact would equal a 1.75 percentage point cut in the federal funds rate, and lift GDP by 3% after two years.

Not quite an 11% increase in nominal expenditure over the next year, but this is the sort of quantitative easing that I have been advocating. Gagnon's paper is here.

A Frightening Quote from Too Big To Fail



I have been reading Andrew Ross Sorkin's Too Big To Fail.

The following is a quote from the book regarding Lehman Brothers:
"While the firm did employ a well-regarded chief risk officer, Madelyn Antoncic, who had a PhD in economics and had worked at Goldman Sachs, her input was virtually nil. She was often asked to leave the room when issues concerning risk came up at executive committee meetings."

I added the bold face. Perhaps there is some explanation, but more than a bit odd...no frightening. At least for anyone who had lent money to Lehman brothers.